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Abstract
Tax fraud is an issue of increasing importance in China. One particu-
larly signicant fraud involves excessive claims for the rebate of VAT on
exported goods. This fraud has two interesting features. First, it requires
the collusion of an intermediary to supply the false documentation that
supports a rebate application. Second, the punishment schedule is con-
vex with capital punishment used in major fraud cases. These features
ensure that the payo¤ function of a rm engaging in fraud is strictly con-
cave in the level of fraud. This gives a well-dened optimization without
the need to appeal to risk aversion. We show that the existence of fraud
does not a¤ect the real output decision of the rm nor the tax policy of
the government. Audit resources can be used to detect rms engaged in
fraud as well as the intermediaries who supply false documents. Under
reasonable assumptions it is shown that resources should be focused on
detecting rms and not intermediaries. Finally, if the government must
take action on fraud a convex punishment scheme is shown to be optimal.
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1 Introduction
In many countries there is growing public concern over issues of tax evasion and
fraud in economic activities. Evidence indicates that tax evasion is especially
severe in developing and transition economies (Schneider and Enste, 2000). The
gures reported by Jia (2002) show that marketization in China has been ac-
companied by the development of a hidden economy. The economic literature
has focused largely upon the evasion of income taxation. In contrast, corporate
tax fraud is an important issue in China and a particular concern of its tax
system. Tax fraud is a form of economic crime and the source of a potentially
serious loss of revenue to the Chinese government.
The Chinese tax system relies on a form of voluntary compliance. Under
Chinese law, all taxpayers are required to assist the tax authority by report-
ing honestly their income and prots and paying a level of tax based on their
reported incomes over time. The system is actively enforced by the State Ad-
ministration of Taxation (SAT) and the Chinese courts which can target investi-
gations and impose substantial penalties for evasion and fraud. In the 2005 tax
year the SAT raised revenue of 3,086.6 billion Yuan, or 16.93% of GDP. On the
other hand, Jia (2002) estimated the revenue lost through evasion and fraud at
444.6 billion Yuan, which was about 35.11% of the total tax revenue of 1,266.6
billion Yuan in 2000.
In this paper we analyze tax fraud in claims for Value Added Tax (VAT) re-
bates on exported products. This fraud has some especially interesting features
from the perspective of tax theory. Producers can claim a VAT rebate on the
value of exports, so overstating the value of exports generates an unwarranted
rebate. To commit such a fraud requires a set of supporting documents: a false
VAT invoice, a customs manifest, and a foreign exchange settlement memo. A
producer committing fraud therefore requires the assistance of another party
to supply the documentation. This interaction between the parties is the rst
interesting aspect of the model. For the VAT fraud the government has a very
clear punishment scale with potentially extreme penalties, rising to capital pun-
ishment for a su¢ cient level of fraud. This explicit penalty scheme is the second
interesting aspect since it is clearly convex, rather than being the linear ne used
in most models of tax evasion.
Many theoretical and empirical studies have addressed the economics of tax
evasion. The standard approach was introduced by Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) in the context of personal income taxation. They assumed that nes
were based on the amount of income evaded by a taxpayer and addressed the
determinants of individual income tax compliance. This basic model has been
extended in a number of directions which are surveyed in Myles (1995) and
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000). There is rather less literature on tax evasion by
rms. Firms can evade taxation either by misreporting sales or prot, or by
making false declarations about input use. It is possible that all these methods
may be required simultaneously to disguise evasion if the information gathering
process of the revenue service is su¢ ciently thorough. The tax evasion decision
for competitive rms has been analyzed by Virmani (1989), Yamada (1990),
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and Cremer and Gahvari (1993). Tax evasion by monopolistic rms has been
studied by Marrelli (1984) and evasion by oligopolistic rms by Marrelli and
Martina (1988).
Various forms of noncompliance with VAT have been reviewed in Keen and
Smith (2006): the authors list under-reported sales, failure to register (ghost
businesses), misclassication of commodities (as tax-exempt or subject to lower
rates) as common for VAT and retail sales tax evasion, as well as forms that
are distinct for VAT evasion, such as false claims for credit or refunds, credit
claimed on purchases that are not creditable, and bogus traders, or rms set up
solely to generate invoices used to recover VAT. Keen and Mintz (2004) show
how an optimal VAT schedule can be constructed to balance the tax revenues
and collection costs (including both administrative and compliance costs). Das-
Gupta and Gang (2003) examine the impact of a particular VAT enforcement
technique, namely, matching of purchase and sales invoices, on the enforcement
and e¢ ciency of VAT. They nd that su¢ ciently intensive audit can induce
truthful reporting but may at the same time distort the purchase-sales and
the input-output decisions of the rm. Fedeli and Forte (1999) model a VAT
evasion decision as an outcome of bargaining between the rms involved in
the VAT chain. In particular, their model predicts that for recovering the lost
revenues an increase in the probability of audit is preferable to an increase in
the penalty for evasion. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2008) investigate how di¤erent
political and structural economic factors a¤ect the collection e¢ ciency of VAT in
a cross-sectional sample of countries, but notably not including China. In these
papers a traditional, consumption-based form of VAT is assumed. The unusual
feature of VAT in China is that it is production-based and capital goods are
included in the VAT base (Ahmad et al., 2004). Furthermore, China employs a
separate export rebate system, with the rebate rates independent of rates paid
on creditable inputs. Whalley and Wang (2008) analyze the welfare implications
of these two features of the VAT system in China using a monetary trade model
and argue that the switch to the traditional form of VAT in China will not be
welfare-improving. They emphasize the importance of export rebates in their
analysis, but do not address the issue of evasion. A similar study is undertaken
in Lin (2008). Fisman and Wei (2001) present an empirical case study of tax
evasion in China, with the focus on Chinas imports from Hong Kong and the
evasion of tari¤s plus VAT. They show that more revenue is lost for products
subject to higher tax rates; furthermore, they nd strong evidence of evasion by
mislabelling, or misclassication of higher-tax products as lower tax products.
Our paper contributes to this literature by presenting a theoretical analysis of
fraud involving a VAT rebate for export sales.
The analysis of tax evasion by rms faces a di¢ culty when combining prot
maximization with a linear punishment schedule: expected prot is linear in the
amount of evasion, so the decision to evade is all or nothing. Marrelli (1984) and
Marrelli and Martina (1988) resolve this problem by assuming the owner of the
rm is risk averse. A similar approach is undertaken in DeMello (2008). This
is acceptable in the context of an owner-manager but does not t convincingly
with wider ownership of the rms equity. Stöwhase and Traxler (2005) assume
3
instead that there is a cost of evading which is convex in the amount of evasion
but do not identify the source of this cost. In contrast, the model we study is
necessarily nonlinear for reasons entirely explicable for the form of tax fraud we
analyze. First, the announced fraud penalty structure is explicitly convex. We
detail this in a brief summary of the Chinese VAT system in Section 2. Second,
the act of fraud we consider involves the participation of an additional party
who must supply false documentation to support the fraud. Section 3 shows
how the cost of securing false documentation provides an explanation of the
evasion cost used by Stöwhase and Traxler (2005). Section 4 demonstrates that
this structure of costs and punishments implies the value of fraud undertaken
by the rm is independent of the tax rate. This produces a separation of the
government choice problem studied in Section 5 into two distinct components.
The rst component determines the optimal tax rate, and this rate is una¤ected
by the existence of fraud. Fraud does not, therefore, imply that the tax rate
is distorted from its e¢ cient value. The auditing and punishment policy is a
consequence of the second component. If the marginal cost of auditing rms
and document suppliers is the same then resources should be focussed upon
auditing rms, not document suppliers. It is shown in Section 6 that the same
conclusions hold under an alternative specication of the punishment structure.
Section 7 demonstrates that if there is a limit to the level of punishment that
can be exacted for a relatively small amount of fraud then convexity of punish-
ment emerges endogenously as the optimal structure of punishments. Section
8 provides the conclusions and some technical details are presented in the Ap-
pendix.
2 Tax Rebates
China, like many other countries, encourages exports and provides tax exemp-
tions and other incentives to industries that produce predominantly for the
international market. Since 1 January 1994 companies have been able to claim
a tax rebate upon exports1 . The level of refundable VAT is equal to the taxable
amount times the unit refund rate. The rate is either 17%, 15%, 13%, 6%, or
5%, depending on whether the products are industrial, electrical, agricultural,
or other goods. In 2004 about 219.59 billion Yuan in VAT refunds were claimed
(SAT, 2005). More recently, from 1 December 2008, the tax rebates were in-
creased for 3,770 items of labor-intensive, mechanical, and electrical products,
or 27.9 percent of the countrys total exports. A further increase in the rebate
rate took e¤ect from 1 January 2009. Chao et al. (2008) have analyzed the role
of the tax rebate in promoting Chinese exports.
1To claim the rebate the enterprise must be qualied as falling into one of the following eight
categories: Manufacturing enterprises with export rights, Foreign trading enterprises with
export rights, Industrial and trading enterprises with export rights, Sino-foreign joint ventures
with export rights and joint ventures chain enterprises with export rights, Foreign invested
enterprises, Enterprises consigning their export goods to other export agents with export
rights, Designated tax rebate enterprises and Specially authorized tax rebate enterprises.
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To claim a rebate a transaction must be recorded in account books as an
export sale. Three basic documents are required to support a claim:
1. VAT invoice: a primary original certicate is required. The goods involved
must be subject to VAT.
2. Customs manifest obtained from a customs o¢ ce. Goods must have passed
through customs and have left Chinese territory.
3. Foreign exchange settlement memo: a full set of documents is submitted
at a local bank. China practices a foreign exchange settlement system
as well as a system of verication and cancellation of foreign exchange
receipts from exports.
A falsied claim for a VAT refund occurs through the submission of false
documents to the SAT. According to Jia (2002), the purchase of false documen-
tation only costs 2%-4% of the VAT invoice from suppliers, and conspiracies
to obtain payment of false claims amount to 17% of the VAT refund from the
SAT. A rst report by the o¢ cial media on export rebate related investiga-
tions showed that the Chinese government may have lost 30 billion Yuan in
tax revenue due to fraudulent practices (South China Morning Post, 1 July
2001). According to the newspaper, some of the practices that businesses used
to cheat include to set up overseas holding rms to issue fake export invoices
and shipping documents; to claim rebates with the help of o¢ cials despite sell-
ing exportswithin China. In addition, exporters have easy access to fake tax
invoices. These practices have extensively abused the VAT tax system since its
introduction in 1994, and local governments have shown little support of the
VAT system or even were involved in the fraudulent practices.
The punishments for tax fraud are described in Articles 205 and 206 of the
Criminal Law of the P. R. of China. Article 205 states that whoever falsely
makes out special invoices for value added tax or any other invoices to defraud
a tax refund for exports or to o¤set tax money shall be sentenced to xed-term
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also
be ned not less than 20,000 yuan but not more than 200,000 yuan; if the amount
of money involved is relatively large or if there are other serious circumstances,
he shall be sentenced to xed-term imprisonment of not less than three years
but not more than 10 years and shall also be ned not less than 50,000 yuan
but not more than 500,000 yuan; if the amount of money involved is huge,
or if there are other especially serious circumstances, he shall be sentenced to
xed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years or life imprisonment and shall
also be ned not less than 50,000 yuan but not more than 500,000 yuan or be
sentenced to conscation of property. Whoever commits the act mentioned in
the preceding paragraph to defraud tax money of the State shall, if the amount
involved is especially huge, and the circumstances are especially serious, thus
causing especially heavy losses to the interests of the State, shall be sentenced
to life imprisonment or death and also to conscation of property.Article 206
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records the same punishment structure for whoever forges or sells forged special
invoices for value added tax.
The seriousness of tax fraud is reected in the sentences imposed by the
courts. Of particular note is a report by the SAT in November 2001 that 19
people had been sentenced to death and 30 given life sentence. In the two cities
of Chaoyang and Puning in Guangdong Province 150 people were convicted for
using false VAT invoices to secure 4.2 billion Yuan of illegal gains.
3 Fraud and Documentation
The key feature of the procedure for obtaining a tax refund described in Sec-
tion 2 is that supporting documentation is required. To make a false claim,
and to engage in an act of fraud, a rm must obtain a complete set of false
documentation including a false tax return. We assume the rm must buy the
fraudulent documentation from an intermediarywho becomes an accomplice
in the act of evasion. This purchase of documents provides an additional ele-
ment of economic interest to the study of fraud in this context since it requires
collaboration between parties. The tax law also recognizes the need for false
documentation and prescribes punishment for rms that are caught engaging in
fraud and for intermediaries caught assisting in the act.
We model the process of document supply by assuming that the rm and
the intermediary negotiate over the price of false documents and, with some
probabilities, the rm and/or the document supplier might be caught cheating
and punished. The price of the false documentation is determined endogenously
by the extent of fraud, the probabilities of detection, and the punishments. The
punishments for the rm and the intermediary (the ne for tax fraud) follow
the practice of the tax code so are convex in fraud, meaning that the greater is
the level of fraud as measured by the overstatement of export, the higher is the
rate of punishment.
Consider a rm that produces a single good, Y , with the use of a numeraire
produced input, K, and labor, L. Assume initially that the rm acts honestly.
The tax rebate is based on the value of exports at the f.o.b. price (SAT 2003,
2005) which we assume is equal to the domestic price. In this case the tax
liability and the rebate for exporting are given by
TH = t [phY  K] ; RH = rphY; (1)
where t is the VAT rate, ph is the domestic price of the output,  is the fraction
of output that is exported, and 0  r  t is the rate of rebate. As Whalley and
Wang (2007) point out, the rebate under this scheme di¤ers from a credit invoice
VAT in that it applies to the full value of exports and not just the produced
input component. Denoting the market price abroad by pe the prot made by
the rm when honest is
H = phY  K   wL+ [pe   ph   g(Y )]Y   TH +RH ; (2)
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where g(Y ) is the transaction cost per unit of export (this can include trans-
portation costs, etc.), and w is the per unit cost of labour. Units of the good
sold at home and exported are identical.
The rm can commit fraud by overstating the fraction of output exported.
This generates an excessive refund of tax but opens the possibility that the rm
is caught and punished. The rm chooses the level of excessive claim taking into
account the price that has to be paid for false documentation and the ne that
is paid if caught. When the rm overstates its export sales it simultaneously
has to understate its domestic sales, since the total output by the rm can be
veried.
If the fraction of export sales in total sales is falsely reported as  + m
(m > 0), the claimed refund with fraud is
RF = rph [+m]Y = RH + rphmY: (3)
Since tax liability is determined by the value of total output at home prices this
remains the same at TF = TH (taking Y as given for the present). The total
value of fraud is thus
E = rphmY = rX; (4)
where X  phmY is the dened as the extent of fraud.
The rm is caught making an excessive claim for refund with probability
qF . When caught it has to pay back the excessive refund and is also subject
to a ne of F . Alternative assumptions can be made about the determinants
of the ne (see Yitzhaki, 1974, for a discussion of this issue in the context of
personal income taxation). In what follows we focus on the case where the ne
is determined by the extent of fraud, so F = F (X). The consequences of an
alternative assumption the ne being determined by the level of fraud are
briey summarized in Section.6.
When the extent of fraud is X the expected prot of the rm is
E [F ] = H + [1  qF ] rX   qFF (X)  V; (5)
where V is the cost of the false documentation required to support the fraudulent
claim. The expected gain to the rm from engaging in the fraud is given by
E [WF ] = E [F ]  H = [1  qF ] rX   qFF (X)  V: (6)
What we now wish to do is to establish the price for documentation as a
function of the extent of fraud, the probability of detection, and the punishment
structure. Given this price it becomes possible to analyze the decision problem
of the rm. We determine the price of false documentation by assuming that it is
determined by a Nash bargaining process between the rm and the intermediary.
The intermediary receives a payment of V from the rm but also faces a
chance of being caught and punished. The intermediarys activity in producing
false documentation is detected with probability qI in which case it has to pay
a penalty I : The ne is determined by the extent of fraud, so I = I (X)
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(Section 6 reports the outcome when the ne is determined by the amount of
tax evaded). The expected gain to the intermediary is
E [WI ] = V   qII (X) : (7)
Following Crocker and Slemrod (2005) we assume identical functional forms for
the penalty functions, so that from this point onward F = I = . This
assumption is consistent with the Chinese criminal law.
Depending on the nature of the intermediary, alternative assumptions can
be made about the relationship between qF and qI . We consider two possible
situations: the intermediary as a corrupt o¢ cial, and the intermediary belonging
to the underground economy. In the rst case the government can monitor the
intermediary (say, audit customs o¢ ces) independently from the producer. It
is plausible to assume that once the intermediary is detected there is a positive
probability that the rm will be also audited and caught. The same applies to
the rm. In the second case the government can only catch the intermediary if
the producer is caught cheating. We capture these two possibilities by modelling
the probabilities as
qF = min fq + p; 1g ; qI = min fp+ q; 1g ; 0    1; (8)
where q and p are the probabilities of being independently audited and caught for
the rm and for the intermediary, respectively. Thus, the rst scenario (corrupt
o¢ cial) corresponds to p > 0. The second scenario (underground economy)
corresponds to p = 0. Parameter  represents the likelihood that catching one
party (rm or intermediary) leads to catching the other.
The bargaining parties take the probabilities of being detected as given and
solve
max
fV g
N = (E [WF ])

(E [WI ])
1  s.t. E [WF ] > 0; E [WI ] > 0; (9)
where  2 [0; 1] is the relative bargaining power of the rm. The necessary
condition for the choice of document price is
@N
@V
=   N
E [WF ]
+
[1  ]N
E [WI ]
= 0: (10)
Assuming qF < 1 and qI < 1, (8) can be used to write the solution to (10) as
V  = (1  ) [1  q   p] rX + ( [p+ q]  (1  ) [q + p]) : (11)
It can be seen from (11) that an increase in fraud (X) implies a higher cost of
documentation. The e¤ect of the other parameters depends upon the balance
of power in bargaining.
4 Production and Evasion Decisions
This section considers the optimization decision of the rm. The rm has to
choose the quantity of the two inputs, the division of output between home
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and export, and the degree of false reporting. The optimization takes into
account the probability of detection and the dependence of the price of false
documentation on the extent of fraud.
The expected prot of the rm is given by
E [F ] = H   V + (1  qF ) rX   qF (X) : (12)
Substituting for V using (11) prot becomes
E [F ] = H +  [(1  qF ) rX   (qI + qF )  (X)] : (13)
It is best to begin by considering the optimum quantity of overstatement, m.
The rst-order condition for the choice of m is
@E [F ]
@m
= [(1  qF ) r   (qI + qF )0 (X)] phY = 0; (14)
Since phY > 0 the su¢ cient condition for overstatement to take place is that
(1  qF ) r   (qI + qF ) 0 (0) > 0; (15)
which requires that the probabilities of fraud being detected and the marginal
rate of increase of the ne at zero fraud must not be too great. We assume that
this condition is satised. The necessary condition can be derived from (14) as
(1  qF ) r   (qI + qF ) 0 (X) = 0: (16)
From (16) we can develop an expression for the optimal value of X by writing
0 (X) =
1  qF
qI + qF
r =
1  q   p
(1 + ) (p+ q)
r: (17)
This can be solved to derive the solution X = X(p; q; ; r):
The e¤ect of changes in the parameters upon the extent of fraud can be ob-
tained from analyzing the comparative statics of the optimization (see Appendix
for the details). The central result is that an increase in the rate of rebate results
in increased fraud. A policy designed to encourage the rms to export therefore
also provides an encouragement for increased fraud. An increase in either q, p
or  reduces the amount of fraud since these raise the probability of the rm
being caught.
The analysis of overstatement can now be employed to analyze input use
and the division of output between home and export. The output of the rm is
determined by the inputs of capital and labor through the production function
Y = Y (K;L) : (18)
For z = K; L; and  the necessary condition for prot maximization can be
written
@E [F ]
@z
=
@H
@z
+  [(1  qF ) r   (qI + qF ) 0 (X)] @X
@z
: (19)
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The important property of these necessary conditions can be observed immedi-
ately: neither input choice nor the export decision is a¤ected by the possibility
of fraud. This follows from the fact that the optimal choice of fraud, (16), en-
sures the second term on the right-hand side of (19) is zero, so the choice of the
optimal quantities is determined by @H=@z alone. Furthermore, the necessary
condition for optimal overstatement does not depend on K, L, and ; so can
be solved independently of those variables. The decision problem of the rm
therefore partitions into a real production decision and a separate fraud deci-
sion. Engaging in fraud does not distort the production decision. This result is
similar to the one obtained in cross-country prot shifting, as, for example, in
Stöwhase (2005).2
Having demonstrated the partition of the choice problem we now look in
detail at the real production decision. Di¤erentiation of H with respect to 
gives the necessary condition
pe   (1  r) ph = g (Y ) + Y g0 (Y ) (20)
With positive, non-decreasing per unit export transaction cost the rms exports
are positive when the price abroad is su¢ ciently high, pe > (1  r) ph.
The rst-order conditions with respect to K and L are
  (1  t) + YK [(1  t) ph + &] = 0; (21)
 w + YL [(1  t) ph + &] = 0; (22)
where &  pe   (1  r) ph   g (Y )   Y g0 (Y ). Using (20), (21) and (22)
imply that the ratio of marginal products is equated to the ratio of factor costs
adjusted for the tax
YK
YL
=
1  t
w
: (23)
This is the same necessary condition that would occur without fraud so the
opportunity for fraud is not distorting the input choices of the rm relative
to the choices made by an honest rm. This implies the output level is also
not a¤ected by fraud. Hence, this form of fraud has no consequence for the
real production decisions of the rm and causes only a false statement of the
activities of the rm.
5 Taxation and Auditing
The literature on tax evasion has discussed alternative representations of the op-
timization problem of the government. The early literature (such as Kolm 1973)
permitted the government to simultaneously optimize all choice variables and,
in the context of personal income tax evasion, generated extreme conclusions.3
This motivated a focus on the separation between the central government which
2The authors are grateful to the anonymous referee for this point.
3Summarized by Kolm as hanging tax evaders with probability zero.
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chooses the tax rate, an independent revenue service that controls auditing pol-
icy, and a judiciary that sets the level of punishment (Reinganum and Wilde
(1986)). We investigate these issues in this section and in Section 7. In this
section we show that there is a natural separation of the optimization in the
model of fraud in particular, the optimal tax rate is independent of the au-
dit strategy and level of punishments (and vice versa) and provide a general
characterization of the optimal audit strategy. Section 7 focuses upon choice of
the optimal structure of punishments.
Consider the choice of the tax rate taking the e¤ort put into monitoring and
the nes levied on the rm and the document supplier as given. Let C (q; p; )
be the cost of monitoring when a probability of detection of the rm qF (q; p; )
and of detection of the document supplier qI (q; p; ) are achieved. We assume
that the government seeks to maximize the sum of tax and ne revenues net of
the monitoring cost.
Under this assumption about the objective of the government, the optimal
values of t and r solve
max
ft;rg
E [TRF ] = TRH   (1  qF ) rX + (qI + qF )  (X)  C (q; p; ) ; (24)
where TRH is the tax revenue less rebate collected when the rm reports hon-
estly
TRH = TH  RH : (25)
The necessary conditions for tax and rebate rates obtained from (24) are
@E [TRF ]
@t
=
@TRH
@t
; (26)
@E [TRF ]
@r
=
@TRH
@r
  (1  qF )X: (27)
The rst condition implies that the optimal tax rate is the same in the presence
of fraud as it is in the absence of fraud. Therefore, the existence of rebate fraud
does not distort the tax policy of the government. TRH is decreasing in r, so
that an increase in the rebate rate always reduces expected tax revenue. This
is not surprising since the rebate is costly and, as implied by (14), does not
a¤ect output so a higher rebate always reduces revenue. The rate of rebate
will therefore be set at a level determined by policy considerations that capture
more general objectives outside of the issues modeled here.
The value of the tax rate, t; and the rebate rate, r; are now taken as chosen,
and we consider the second part of the optimization. This allows us to assess
whether auditing resources should be focused upon detecting rms engaged in
fraud or intermediaries supplying false documentation (when the latter can be
audited separately from the rms). Consider, rst, the scenario of the interme-
diary belonging to the hidden economy so that p = 0. In this case only  and
q can be chosen. Using (8) in (24) and di¤erentiating with respect to q and 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gives the following expressions for the derivatives of revenue:
@E [TRF ]
@q
= rX + (1 + )  (X)  Cq (q; 0; ) ; (28)
@E [TRF ]
@
= q (X)  C (q; 0; ) : (29)
The document supplier can only be detected if the chosen q and  are both
strictly positive. This requires
rX + (1 + )  (X)  Cq (q; 0; )  0; (30)
q (X)  C (q; 0; )  0: (31)
To aid discussion, assume initially that the marginal monitoring costs are iden-
tical with Cq (q; 0; ) = C (q; 0; ). If there is an interior solution for q (0 <
q < 1) then (30) is satised with equality. Since  (X) > 0 (31) cannot be an
equality, and so  = 0, i.e. the optimal solution involves no attempt to catch
intermediaries. The optimal value for  can only be positive if q = 1. Hence,
the government nds it optimal to monitor document suppliers only when fraud
by the rms is detected with certainty. But if q = 1 the rms would not engage
in fraud in the rst place. When the assumption of identical marginal moni-
toring costs is relaxed positive values of both q and  are possible only when
C (q; 0; ) < Cq (q; 0; ). Hence, unless the marginal cost of monitoring inter-
mediaries is relatively low the government will concentrate resources on auditing
rms.
Now consider the scenario when the intermediary is a corrupt o¢ cial and
can be monitored separately from the rm. This makes p an additional choice
variable. The necessary condition is obtained by substituting (8) into (24) and
di¤erentiating with respect to p. The result implies that p will be positive only
if
(1 + ) (X)  Cp (q; p; )  0: (32)
Assume initially that the marginal costs of monitoring are identical for q and p,
so
Cq (q; p; ) = Cp (q; p; ) : (33)
Under this assumption it follows from (30) and (32) that if there is an interior
solution for q (0 < q < 1) then p would necessarily be zero. Once more, this is
a case for which resources would be focussed on auditing the rm. The value of
p can be positive only if q = 1 a situation in which there would be no fraud.
Interior solutions for both audit probabilities can arise when the marginal cost
of monitoring the intermediary is lower than the marginal cost of monitoring the
rm. In general, when the relative marginal cost of monitoring the document
suppliers is su¢ ciently high it is optimal for the government to monitor only
the rm.
The results of this section have demonstrated that the possibility of tax
fraud should not distort either the tax policy of the government or the level of
rebate given. The analysis of monitoring shows that there is a strong incentive
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to focus resources on catching dishonest rms. Even if the marginal cost of
increasing the probability of catching rms is equal to the marginal cost of
increasing the probability of catching intermediaries the optimal policy is still
to focus resources on catching rms rather than intermediaries.
6 Fine on Tax Evaded
This section briey reviews the implications of assuming that the penalty is
determined by the value of fraud. Consequently, the penalty is now given by
 = (E). Our main observation is that this change does not signicantly
a¤ect the previous conclusions.
The price for the false documents, V , changes only to the extent that  (X) is
replaced by  (E) in (11). The su¢ cient condition that some fraud is undertaken
is given by
1  qF   (qI + qF ) 0 (0) > 0; (34)
which requires that the probabilities of the fraud being detected and the mar-
ginal rate of increase of the ne at zero fraud must not be too great. When
fraud is undertaken the rst-order condition for the choice of E gives
0 (E) =
1  qF
qI + qF
=
1  q   p
(1 + ) (p+ q)
: (35)
The details of the comparative static analysis are given in the Appendix. To
summarize, we show that the e¤ects of the probability parameters, q, p, and
 have the same sign as in the previous case. However, there is an additional
result that the value of the excess claim is independent of the tax and rebate
rates. The production and export decisions of the rm remain una¤ected by
the possibility of fraud.
The result in (35) shows that E is constant as t and/or r change. The
objective function of the government can be written as
E [TRF ] = TRH   (1  qF )E + (qI + qF )  (E)  C (q; p; ) : (36)
Since E is constant this di¤ers only by a constant from the objective in the
problem
max
ft;rg
TRH ; (37)
which is the optimization of tax revenue with no fraud and the correct rebate
for export production. The optimization (37) must therefore have the same
optimal solution as in the case of honesty. Hence the possibility of fraud does
not a¤ect the optimal tax and rebate rates. Note that even though fraud does
not change the optimal r and t it does a¤ect the level of revenue.
The e¤ect of the auditing probabilities upon the revenues net of costs is given
by (30), (31) and (32) but with  (X) replaced by  (E). The same arguments
then apply regarding the relative monitoring of the rm and the intermediary.
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7 Convexity of Punishment
The Chinese criminal law relating to tax fraud is characterized by the fact that
the punishments increase more than proportionally with the level of fraud. In
extreme cases even capital punishment is possible. Such a punishment structure
can be interpreted as being a convex function of the amount of fraud, and it is
interesting to consider whether convexity of punishment emerges endogenously
as the revenue-maximizing choice of the government. Kolm (1973) provided an
argument why extreme punishments may have a role, but recent work by Boad-
way and Sato (2000) on endogenous punishment has shown more reasonable
outcomes are also possible.
We begin by describing the outcome if the penalty function is concave. Note
that
@2E [F ]
@X2
=   (qI + qF ) 00 (X) ; (38)
when the ne is determined by the extent of fraud, and
@2E [F ]
@X2
=  r2 (qI + qF )00 (rX) ; (39)
when the ne is determined by the value of fraud. In both cases the optimal
level of X must be a corner solution if the ne is concave (00 < 0). In other
words, with a concave punishment if there is an incentive for the rm to cheat at
all then the expected gain from cheating is unbounded, and the rm will choose
the maximal possible level of fraud unless it is monitored with certainty. Hence,
if the government aims to reduce the amount of fraud when full monitoring of
the rm is prohibitively expensive, it will employ a convex punishment schedule.
To investigate the issue of convexity further we adopt specic functional
forms for  and C: This allows the optimal choice of the shape of the punishment
function and the probabilities of fraud detection to be analyzed explicitly. We
choose to focus on the case when the penalty is determined by the amount of
tax evaded,  (E) : The results are similar in the case of  = (X).
The functional forms that we adopt are
C =
1
2
 
cpp
2 + cqq
2 + c
2

; cp; cq; c > 0; (40)
and
 = E ;  > 0: (41)
The positive constant  is a scale parameter.  is a choice parameter for the
government, and the punishment is convex if   1. With the assumed penalty
function the expected gain from tax fraud for the rm is
E [F ]  H =  (1  qF ) [E   'E ] ; (42)
where
'  qI + qF
1  qF : (43)
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Consider the choice of the rm if the governments selects a concave punish-
ment function with 0   < 1: In this case E grows faster than 'E , and the
two functions cross at
E = ' (E) = '1=(1 ) (44)
so that for E  E the expected gain monotonically increases in E. Conse-
quently, for any nite value of '; the expected benet is unbounded. The rm
therefore has an incentive to cheat without limit. If the objective of the gov-
ernment is to control fraud it therefore has to choose a convex penalty with
  1.
The optimal value of  is determined by the magnitude of '. The opti-
mization can be analyzed by rst observing that if '  1;the expected gain for
the rm from fraud is non-positive for any E > 0 when   1. The rm will
therefore choose E = 0: The government can achieve this outcome by choosing
low values of p, q, and , and, provided that it is free to choose the value of ,
set  high enough to ensure ' > 1. In other words, the government completely
prevents tax fraud by announcing a linear or convex punishment with a high
scale factor and performs the minimal auditing needed to ensure compliance.
This is a similar conclusion to the one obtained by Kolm (1973) in the context
of personal income taxation.
The value of  sets the scale of the punishment function whereas  controls
the rate of increase of the gradient. There are several good reasons why there
may be a limit on the value of the scale parameter, . This scale parameter can
be interpreted as the punishment for a unit of fraud (E = 1). The standard
approach to the economics of crime argues that the punishment for any illegal act
must be set in line with those for other crimes to provide the correct incentives
for the e¢ cient minimization of crime (Cooter and Ulen, 2000). Setting the
punishment at a high level for a limited quantity of tax fraud can be inconsistent
with these incentives. This provides an argument for the limitation of nes for
small amounts of tax fraud as part of a general crime prevention policy. We now
choose to work under the assumption that there is an exogenous upper bound 
on this parameter that prevents the government simply eliminating fraud while
setting low values of the audit probabilities.
The government chooses (; p; q; ) to maximize
E [TRF ]  TRH =   (1  (q + p))E (; p; q; )
+ (1 + ) (p+ q) [E (; p; q; )]
   1
2
 
cpp
2 + cqq
2 + c
2

: (45)
subject to the constraint 0  p; q;   1;   1 and
E (; p; q; ) = 0 if
(1 + ) (p+ q)
1  p  q   1 (46)
E (; p; q; ) =

1  (q + p)
 (1 + ) (p+ q)
1=( 1)
if
(1 + ) (p+ q)
1  p  q  < 1 (47)
The expression for E in (47) is obtained by combining (8), (43), and (44).
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In the tables we illustrate the optimal policy when cp = cq = c = 3 for
various levels of . Table 1 represents the case of the intermediary belonging to
the hidden economy and, hence, cannot be monitored independently (p = 0). In
Table 2 the intermediary is a corrupt o¢ cial so can be monitored independently
from the rm (p is a choice variable). The optimal policy involves auditing both
the rm and the intermediary, with the probability of auditing the intermediary
being signicantly lower (this, in particular, results in the marginal cost of
monitoring the intermediary being lower than the marginal cost of monitoring
the rm). When the intermediary is a corrupt o¢ cial, it is less than half as
likely to be detected as is the rm. When the intermediary belongs to the
underground economy the di¤erence is even larger, and the di¤erence increases
the lower is the ceiling on the punishment scale factor, . Lower  also results
in the punishment function being more convex, and it has opposite e¤ects on
the probabilities of monitoring the rms and the intermediaries: qF increases,
and qI (slightly) decreases as  becomes lower. Hence, being able to levy only a
small penalty on low amounts of fraud results in a rapidly increasing punishment
structure.
 qF qI 
0:05 0:78 0:07 2:01
0:10 0:76 0:09 1:61
0:15 0:75 0:10 1:37
0:20 0:74 0:12 1:23
0:25 0:73 0:13 1:12
 p qF qI 
0:05 0:16 0:66 0:26 2:88
0:10 0:18 0:64 0:28 2:30
0:15 0:20 0:63 0:30 1:93
0:20 0:21 0:62 0:31 1:69
0:25 0:22 0:61 0:33 1:49
Table 1: Optimal Policy Table 2: Optimal Policy
(Hidden Economy) (Corrupt O¢ cial)
8 Conclusions
The paper has provided an analysis of VAT fraud in the context of the Chinese
rebate for exported goods. The interesting features of this situation are the con-
vex punishment schedules which are dened in the relevant tax law and the fact
that an additional party has to be involved in the supply of the documentation
required to support the fraud.
The analysis shows that there is a well-dened choice problem even for a
rm which maximizes prot. This is due to the convexity of punishments in
the level of fraud. It is therefore unnecessary to impose risk aversion upon the
preferences of the rm. The decision process of the rm separates into two
parts. The real decisions of the rm on input use and the level of output 
are una¤ected by the possibility of engaging in fraud.
Two options for the punishment schedules were considered: based on the
extent of the fraud and based on the value of fraud. In the rst case the extent
of fraud increases as the tax rate increases. In the second case the value of the
fraud remains constant as the tax rate is changed. The interesting nding is
that in both cases the optimal tax rate is una¤ected by the existence of fraud.
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Hence, there is no incentive for the government to reduce the tax rate to reduce
fraud or of raising it to cover for lost revenue. Fraud therefore does not imply
a deviation of the tax rate from its e¢ cient value.
The choice between focusing audit policy upon the rm or upon the sup-
plier of false documentation depends primarily upon the cost of monitoring. If
the marginal costs of monitoring the rm and the document supplier are equal,
the policy is most likely to involve audits focused upon the rm. The analysis
showed that when the punishment function is concave the rm has an incentive
to commit the maximum possible fraud unless it is monitored with certainty.
Therefore, a government with limited resources to monitor compliance will em-
ploye a convex punishment in order to reduce fraud. This result provides support
for the structure of Chinese criminal law and shows that auditing and convex
punishments can be determined endogenously in this model of crime.
We must note that the convex punishment structure for tax fraud in China
should not, perhaps, be viewed as a unique phenomenon. Shikalova (2004)
analyzed payroll tax evasion by rms in Russia, under a slightly di¤erent set
of assumptions. Model calibration to Russian data showed that the shape of
the punishment function for the payroll tax evasion is convex in the amount of
labour income in black cash.
A Comparative static analysis
In the Appendix we list the properties of the optimal evasion decision of the
rm summarized in Sections 4 and 6.
A.1 Evasion decision when tine determined by the extent
of fraud
dX
dt
= 0;
dX
dr
=
1  qF
(qI + qF ) 00 (X)
> 0
dX
dq
=   1 + (1  ) p
(1 + ) (p+ q)
2
00 (X)
r < 0;
dX
dp
=   1  (1  ) q
(1 + ) (p+ q)
2
00 (X)
r < 0;
dX
d
=   1  q + p
(1 + )
2
(p+ q) 00 (X)
r < 0
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A.2 Evasion decision when ne determined by the evaded
tax
dX
dt
=
1  qF
(qI + qF ) 00 (E)

1  ph
pe

> 0;
dX
dr
=
1  qF
(qI + qF ) 00 (E)
> 0;
dE
dt
=
dE
dr
= 0
dX
dq
=   1 + (1  ) p
(1 + ) (p+ q)
2  < 0;
dX
dp
=   1  (1  ) q
(1 + ) (p+ q)
2
00 (E)
< 0;
dX
d
=   1  q + p
(1 + )
2
(p+ q) 00 (E)
< 0
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